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Everything that can be counted does not necessarily count; everything that counts cannot 
necessarily be counted.  
Albert Einstein 
 
 
Abstract 
Investors traditionally prioritised tangible outcomes (money, land, machinery) in order to 
protect their financial assets. However, the intangible economy (trust, human resources, 
information, reputation) that co-exists draws attention to new expectations that request 
the continuous, active and within the public sphere involvement of investors in order to 
protect their assets by prioritising intangible resources.  
 
The paper argues that investors in intangible outcomes who aim to achieve change in 
corporations share the same limitations within the financial and non-financial field. The 
case of Nonprofit-Business Partnerships is employed in order to demonstrate how change 
can be achieved.   The role of investors is crucial in facilitating the shift from the tangible 
to the intangible economy. Investment in the intangible economy is a mechanism of co-
determining the priority of responsibilities in the context of corporate social 
responsibility.  
 
 
Introduction 
“How many Enrons would it take to destroy global capitalism by leading shareholders to 
withdraw their financial support for the corporate community?” asks intelligently Jill 
Solomon (2004: 7). This is currently the epitome of why corporate governance 
mechanisms, policies and systems are put in place: to safeguard the existing capitalist 
system which prioritises tangible resources remains unchanged. However over the last 
decades, the relationship between the market and society has been going through rapid 
transformation. Corporations emerged as powerful actors controlling a multitude of 
resources and eager to attain access not only to financial but equally to non-financial 
resources, which they gradually revaluate as equally, if not more important than the 
monetary resources. On the other hand, the on-going empowerment of civil society 
organisations has played an important role in transforming non-profit entities into equally 
powerful actors of change within society (Doh and Teegen, 2002; Bendelll, 2000). The 
legitimacy of corporations is not any more only subject to government regulation as 
“social actors have emerged to raise questions and, in some cases, directly intervene in 
the governance of major corporations” (Clark et al, 2008).  
 
While the influence of business has been increasing (Solomon, 2004) similarly the 
demands for an institutionalised level of responsibilities has found voice in the 
conceptualisation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Crane and Matten, 2004). 
CSR is a call for business to operate in a responsible way which appeared as an antiphon 
to the divorce of ownership and control aiming to reform the practices of business by 
introducing an organised and institutionalised response from within corporations. The 
concept of CSR is employed in this paper as a lens to examine the failure of investors’ 
influence in corporate management. 
 
Although capitalism as a political and economic system survived in the 21st century 
(Solomon, 2004: 7) it currently undergoes a transformation. We have moved from the 
20th century of shareholder supremacy where tangible resources were prioritised to the 
21st century of stakeholder transcendency where intangibles gradually push through 
obscurity. Within  the financial community the concept of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) is currently appropriated serving profitability, a tangible resource, through the 
belief that being ethical, an intangible resource, increases profitability (Hancock, 1999; 
Monks, 2001; Co-operative Bank, 2001) or by employing CSR as “a secondary risk 
management” (Power, 2004: 34-35) strategy in order to safeguard their corporate 
reputation (intangible). The paper argues that the nature of CSR has influenced the 
practices of new governance mechanisms within the financial (e.g. socially responsible 
investment-SRI and shareholder activism) and social spheres (nonprofit-business 
partnerships). In effect they all share the same systematic failures characterised largely by 
their inability to deliver systematic change within corporations. 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility as a Driver for Change 
Parallel to the prominence of profit attainment through the operations of business sprang 
the increase in the misuse of corporate power due the original “divorce of ownership and 
control” (Solomon, 2004: 3). As a result the responsibilities that used to reside only with 
the owner(s) of a corporation who also had the control of business were separated and 
dispersed among shareholders and management. The effects of the above were beneficial 
for business profitability but in many cases detrimental for wider parts of society due to 
corporate greed; examples include: overpriced stock price, excessive executive 
remuneration, selling knowingly unhealthy or dangerous products; destroying the 
environment; unfair treatment of employees and so forth. These impacts have been 
extensively discussed in the literature (Hutton, 1995; Hutton and Giddens, 2001; Crane 
and Matten, 2004). Hence when any of the above instances of human greed would 
surface on the public sphere, corporations were confronted with reputational crisis which 
impacted with the public’s perception of their role. Such crises gradually gathered 
momentum resulting in cynicism towards business which according to Tevino and Nelson 
(2007: 3) “has become an epidemic throughout society”. While the influence of business 
has been increasing (Solomon, 2004) similarly the demands for an institutionalised level 
of responsibilities has found voice in the conceptualisation of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (Crane and Matten, 2004). The European Commission’s Green 
Paper (Commission of the European Communities, 2001) defines CSR as:  
 
“a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis”.  
 CSR is largely voluntary in nature and as such has gathered momentum “testified by the 
wide array of initiatives that range from indicators for responsible practices in the stock 
exchange marketsi to social and environmental reportingii and a multitude of corporate 
community involvement programmes” (Seitanidi and Crane, 2008). 
 
One of the failures of the voluntary concept of CSR is “characterised by many 
unsystematic practices, i.e. constellations of arrangements that are fit for purpose within 
specific contexts but which lack transferability and sustainability” (Seitanidi and Crane, 
2008). On the other hand one of the positive results of CSR is that it has elicited 
intensification and debate within all sectors of society with regard to the responsibilities 
of each sector in addressing environmental and social issues (Seitanidi, 2006).  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a worldwide phenomenon that has been driven 
by all sectors of society, i.e. by business (McWilliams and Siegel, 2002; Zadek, 2001), by 
non-profit organisations (Bendell and Lake, 2000) and by government (Moon, 2004). 
Moon (2002) argues that the network mode of operation of business with government and 
nonprofit organisations (NPOs) represents a new system of re-orientation of governance 
roles among the sectors whereby the increased interdependencies were guided by the 
pursuit of shared interests and values. The central claim of CSR initiatives is to develop 
beneficial changes within society. However, due to its voluntary character it lacks 
systematic and consistent delivery of outcomes across its different manifestations. One of 
these manifestations of CSR is within the financial field and its interface with corporate 
governance. Solomon (2004:15) suggests that the interface between the two is the 
‘management quality’. In other words, the extent to which managers integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their financial decisions and practices both systematically and 
consistently. Socially responsible investment and shareholder activism are interfaces 
which aim to deliver positive changes within corporations. The next section will discuss 
briefly each one in order to highlight their intangible characteristics and the rational 
behind the failure to deliver systematic change in businesses. 
 
SRIs and Shareholder Activism 
Within the above climate the interaction between the different types of investors and 
corporations has attracted attention due to the central claim suggesting that change can be 
delivered within companies (Haigh and Hazelton, 2004). Some of the interfaces through 
which investors can deliver these changes are through socially responsible investments 
(SRIs) (Haigh and Hazelton, 2004; Jayne and Skerratt, 2003) and shareholder activism 
(Haigh and Hazelton, 2004; Lewis and Mackenzie, 2000). 
 
SRI is a process by which investment institutions are being encouraged to prioritise issues 
such as environmental stewardship, employee and community welfare when making 
decisions about their portfolio companies instead solely looking at the financial 
performance of a corporation (Jayne and Skerratt, 2003; Pridahm, 2001).  
 
As suggested by Haigh and Hazelton (2004: 67-68) the claim that SRIs can deliver in 
their current form of practice towards systematic corporate change is unsubstantiated. 
They suggest that: 
 
“First, SRI funds in all regions command negligible market share, which 
discounts the argument for a direct effect on companies. Second, even if SRI 
funds commanded greater market share, any effects on security prices 
would be short-lived, given liquid capital markets. Third, there are no 
guarantees that financial markets will look to SRI funds to signal 
undisclosed future revenue growth or costs, and accordingly follow 
investment actions of SRI funds”. 
 
In effect SRI funds have not changed their priorities in their decision making process, i.e. 
to prioritise the positive social and environmental impacts of companies through their 
operations. Instead, their decision making process prioritises the tangible financial 
outcome as the primary criterion upon which they base the inclusion of a company in 
their portfolio of investments. As a result “they contribute to the economic forces that 
cause socially inequitable practices to arise in the first place. … Capital markets thus 
‘reward’ companies that inter alia use the lowest prices for their production.” (Haigh and 
Hazelton (2004: 66). As such this is a systematic failure to move beyond the tangible 
outcomes and prioritise the intangible outcomes such as trust in the quality of decisions 
that incorporate the responsibility towards society. Nisar (2006: 384) suggests that 
“intangible factors such as organizational knowledge, product innovation and employee 
morale, rather than physical assets, like real estate, are now the source of greatest value”. 
Indeed ethical, social and environmental practices can be grouped within the realm of 
intangibles as they deliver positive benefits towards the corporate reputation. More 
importantly since SRIs aim to encourage change within corporations by transforming 
their organisational practices predominately they aspire to transform the organisational 
culture. “Organisational transformation is a mode of social change that involves a sharp 
and simultaneous shift in strategy, structure, process and distribution of organisational 
power” (Shen, 2005: 3). In fact, according to Martin (2000: 452)  
 
“to change is to take different actions than previously. To take different 
actions than previously means to make different choices. Different choices 
produce change. The same choices produce sameness, a reinforcement of 
the status quo. …To espouse a different operating principle (e.g., we have 
decided to become customer focused) from the past does not represent 
change. Only if different choices lead to action on the different operating 
principle will change be produced. As Argyris observes, there is often a 
substantial gap between espoused theory and theory in use”. 
 
According to the UK Social Investment Forum (2001) there are three strategies for 
investors to get involved: a/ ethical screening; b/ shareholder influence, c/ cause-based 
investing.  All three require consideration of and access to “ethical, social and 
environmental” information (Jayne and Skerratt, 2003: 3). However, due to the absence 
of external monitoring and verification from people who have knowledge, experience and 
access to what constitutes  ethical or environmental practices,  the disclosure of corporate 
information (Laufer, 2003), upon which for example ethical screening is based, corporate 
reporting is often seen as a form of green (Lydenberg, 2002; Stittle, 2002) or 
ethicalwashing. Hence the people who make decisions in SRIs have not the set of skills 
and access to information that would allow them to make high quality decisions that 
would deliver organisational or industry level change.  
 
Similarly, shareholder activism is “the process by which shareholders of a listed 
company, under the provisioning of securities legislation in various jurisdictions, can 
requisition its members to meet and vote on specific resolutions” (Haigh and Hazelton, 
2004: 60). They suggest that the current mechanisms of shareholder activism have been 
largely unsuccessful due to their ad hoc character to address social and environmental 
issues. The Cadbury Report (Cadbury Code, 1992) suggested that institutional investors 
should arrange regular one-to-one meetings with corporate managers, should file 
resolutions in order to positively influence social and environmental issues and should 
pay attention to the composition of the board of directors (Solomon, 2004: 118). 
Furthermore, Haigh and Hazelton (2004: 50) suggest that although in some countries 
such practices have been embraced however in reality there are only “isolated instances 
of ‘success’ in achieving outcomes [which] mask the reality that systematic change to 
industrial practices or engagement with issues at an industry level has not been the focus 
of shareholder activists”. An encouraging exemption is the coalition of five 
environmental organizations: Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, US Public Interest 
Research Group, Bluewater Network, and the Center for International Environmental 
Law, who endorsed a total of 49 environmental shareholder resolutionsiii (FoE, 2007). 
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have the mandate, in-depth information, expertise 
and campaigning skills in order to make informed decisions about the environmental 
issues that a corporation is facing. Largely shareholder resolutions are seen leading to 
gradual ad hoc interventions to environmental and social problems “unlike to result in 
long-term desired social outcomes” (Haigh and Hazelton, 2004: 67). More importantly 
the financial elites involved usually in the engagement process prefer the route of ‘quite 
diplomacy’ (Clark et al, 2008) holding discussions behind closed doors in a ‘club-like 
atmosphere’ where ‘spontaneity is not encouraged’ (ibid). The reluctance to overtly and 
publicly raise issues due to the overlapping networks of fund managers, insurers, analysts 
and corporate directors captures the potential for systematic and continuous change 
through shareholder activism. Unlike the environmental NPOs the individual and 
institutional investors lack the information and more importantly the necessary skills that 
would increase the potential of delivering change, including: confidence, confrontational 
writing and speaking, argumentation based on in depth specialist information, developing 
creative discourse around a technical issue, imagining alternatives and so forth. 
 
The common denominator of the above interfaces aiming to bring change is their failure 
to deliver: a/ continuous and substantial change rather than in ad hoc cases (Haigh and 
Hazelton, 2004), b/ through active engagement (Lewis and Mackenzie, 2000) instead of 
through “passive market signalling” (Lewis and Mackenzie, 2000: 215) and c/ within the 
public arena in an overt fashion as opposed to holding “conversation amongst financial 
elites about common interests” (Clark et al, 2008). Moreover, the intangible character of 
the changes to be delivered is confronted with the prioritisation of tangible resources, 
predominately financial, and the lack of skills related to intangible resources. 
 
In order to demonstrate how change can be delivered successfully in a business by 
developing the necessary skills the case study between WWF and Lafarge is presented 
below within the context of a nonprofit-business partnership. Although the case is outside 
the financial arena it lies within the new forms of flexible governance, where also SRIs 
and shareholder activism would be categorised. 
 
A Case Study from Nonprofit-Business Partnerships: WWF-Lafarge 
Partnerships between Nonprofit organisations (NPOs) and Business (BUS) is one of the 
most challenging ways that organizations have been implementing CSR. NPO-BUS 
partnerships are one of the three different types of dual partnerships (Figure 1) referred to 
as ‘social partnerships’ (Waddock 1988; Googins & Rochlin 2000) or as recently named 
‘cross-sector partnerships that address social issues’ (CSSPs) (Selsky and Parker 2005:1). 
A fourth type, tripartite partnerships, involves all three sectors: profit, government and 
non-profit organisations (Figure 1).  
 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Cross Sector Social Partnerships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Waddock (1988:18) social partnerships are: 
 
“A commitment by a corporation or a group of corporations to work with 
an organisation from a different economic sector (public or nonprofit). It 
involves a commitment of resources - time and effort - by individuals from 
all partner organisations. These individuals work co-operatively to solve 
problems that affect them all. The problem can be defined at least in part as 
a social issue; its solution will benefit all partners. Social partnership 
addresses issues that extend beyond organisational boundaries and 
traditional goals and lie within the traditional realm of public policy - that 
is, in the social arena. It requires active rather than passive involvement 
from all parties. Participants must make a resource commitment that is 
more than merely monetary”.  
 
Delivering change towards social (e.g. education, health) and environmental issues within 
corporations is similarly the main focus of social partnerships by combining 
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organisational resources in order to offer solutions that benefit both partners, but also 
society at large. As such, NPO–BUS partnerships represent the alignment of strategic 
business interests with societal expectations, expressed through NPOs (Covey and 
Brown, 2001; Austin 2000). Partnerships offer important insights into implementation of 
CSR, not least because BUS-NPO partnerships are seen as governance mechanisms 
(Moon, 2002) that can deliver changes within the new arena of ‘ad hoc’ social policy. 
The aim of this section is to present the success of a partnership in delivering change. In 
so doing, the paper compares new types of corporate engagement across the financial and 
social arena in order to suggest how change can be delivered. 
 
One of the most widely recognised NPOs is WWF, an environmental nonprofit 
organisation that used to have be known for its collaborative relationships with BUSs. 
One of its partnerships is with Lafarge, the world leader in construction materials. The 
relationship between the partners started in 2000. Seven years into the partnership the 
relationship reached maturity where “WWF is contributing the expertise Lafarge needs to 
develop and improve its environmental policies and practices and to raise awareness of 
the importance of sustainability and biodiversity conservation” (WWF, 2007). 
 
In 2003 WWF moved beyond its collaborative approach to use confrontation and to 
publicly challenge the corporation reclaiming its NGO identity and responsibility. In 
effect, WWF UK returned in 2003 its share of a £3.5m funding to Lafarge “because they 
refused to abandon plans to build the UK's biggest superquarry on an unspoiled Scottish 
island” (Third Sector, 2003). The original partnership was between WWF International 
and Lafarge; the UK branch of WWF opposed the quarry before the beginning of the 
partnership, therefore they rejected the money as they did not want to create confusion 
about their position. The website of WWF Scotland remarked in 2004:  
 
“Since the start of the international partnership between WWF and Lafarge 
in 2000, WWF has consistently and fully supported the actions taken by 
Scottish NGOs opposed to the quarry (LINK Quarry Group), and has 
repeatedly affirmed its strong opposition to the proposed 600 hectares 
quarry. … The history of this controversy demonstrates that engaging in 
partnerships with companies does not prevent WWF from criticising and 
opposing any controversial aspect of our partners' activities. WWF believes 
that it is important to engage with business and industry in the push 
towards a more sustainable future, and will continue to seek out 
partnerships that, it strongly believes, can contribute globally to significant 
social and environmental benefits.” (WWF, 2004). 
 
In April 2004, WWF’s website welcomed the decision of Lafarge not to pursue its 
interests further in the development of the quarry. The above is an incident where WWF, 
a collaborative NPO, publicly challenged a partner and returned money, hence 
externalising the conflict and placing within the social arena. So far it appears to be the 
only UK charity that used this approach publicly, although Greenpeace UK made similar 
remarks about their intention to pursue a similar tactic: 
 
“… companies need to know that if they don’t move far enough that people 
are going to come back and they’re going to campaign” (Greenpeace, 
Marketing and Fundraising Director, citied in: Seitanidi, 2006: 229). 
 
The change in WWF’s political position marks an important shift in one of the 
traditionally collaborative NPOs as it emphasizes the need for a ‘weapon’ that 
collaborative NPOs need to employ in order to challenge corporations and push them 
towards change: 
 
“You don’t negotiate unless you have some weapon that you can use. In 
those negotiations you don’t have a power to negotiate. What in fact 
happened in many instances was that yes from time to time the corporation 
discussed issues with the NGO. But they began to set limitations in the way 
the NGO could operate. If the NGO criticised then the company professed 
to be angry, because we are engaged into discussion with you. So, that 
process of co-option in fact silenced quite a lot of NGOs.” (General 
Secretary, International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation, 
citied in: Seitanidi, 2006: 229) 
The ability of an NPO to externalise the conflict and increase the reputational risks for the 
business partner appear to be important in order to facilitate organisational change in 
BUSs. However, it seems possible only when 1/ there is no financial dependency from 
the BUS partner; 2/ the NPO holds a strong reputation and is well-established, as was the 
case with WWF. The NPO could afford to return £3.5m, which in fact might not be the 
case with other NPOs or indeed in case of financial dependency between two social 
actors. 
 
Partnerships have been portrayed by executives in NPOs as “opportunistic” (Seitanidi, 
2006: 250) however there are instances that confirm the potential for delivering change, 
as in the above case. Within the research on NPO-BUS partnerships of Seitanidi (2006) 
the potential of challenging a partner within a partnership relationship has been further 
confirmed in one more occasion. The case study between The Prince’s Trust and the 
Royal Bank of Scotland provided evidence of a similar incident: the Prince’s Trust 
returned money to its partner, the Royal Bank of Scotland, due to a disagreement on the 
role of a funded position by the Bank within the course of the partnership (Seitanidi, 
2006). The confrontational approach espoused by collaborative NPOs safeguards their 
autonomy and independence both within the organisation but also externally with their 
stakeholders.  
 
In social partnerships the primary aim is to serve society and not the organisational needs 
(Seitanidi, 2006). In fact the social character of partnerships might indeed appear against 
the organisational needs (one of the basic one for NPOs is funding) as was the case with 
Lafarge and WWF. By returning the money to Lafarge WWF UK forced change within 
the BUS and in effect Lafarge changed their actions. However, it appears that in most 
cases the politics of NPO-BUS partnerships fail the societal dimension of partnerships by 
capturing the potential of organisational core changes within the convergence of need for 
tangible resources rather than divergence of missions and hence intangible resources 
(Seitanidi, 2006). 
 It appears that the experienced collaborative NPOs (e.g. WWF) only recently realised the 
risks in forging close relationships with BUSs and decided to assume a more critical role 
even publicly similar to the confrontational NPOs (such as Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace). One way to break the financial dependency within close relationships 
where money are transferred from one partner to the other is to develop the necessary set 
of skills to challenge corporations in order to force change by developing closer 
collaborations among diverse NPOs. As a result the closer collaboration among different 
NPOs, but also the exchange of information and facts, might enhance openness and 
transparency in NPO-BUS partnerships, increase civil society’s trust of organisations and 
institutions, and might also allow partnerships to reclaim their societal role. 
 
Investors in Intangible Outcomes 
As it becomes obvious from the above, there is a category of outcomes that can be 
classified as intangibles, including knowledge, capabilities and skills. The intangible 
assets were considered as early as 1987 to be the most important resource for a company 
(Itami and Roehl, 1987), one expression of which is the core competencies (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990). Organisations, predominately BUSs, actively engage in acquiring or 
internally producing intangible resources as they are likely to increase the value of the 
company (Sanchez et al, 2000). As Galbreath (2002: 116) points out, one of the most far-
reaching changes in this field in the 21st century concerns what constitutes value and what 
the rules of value creation might be. Moving from the tradition of tangible to intangibles 
and to relationship assets constitutes a change in perceiving where the value of the firm is 
positioned today: “what becomes easily apparent is that the firm’s success is ultimately 
derived from relationships, both internal and external” (Galbreath, 2002: 118).  
 
The relationship between NPOs and BUSs is seen today as a source of cross-sector 
intangible outcomes that can benefit all parties. It is important, however, to distinguish 
between the different types of outcomes with regard to who is the recipient of the 
The meaning of the verb ‘invest’ is “to put (money or effort) into something to make a 
profit or achieve a result” (Cambridge, 2007). The above definition captures both the 
tangible and intangible dimensions of an investment. In the case of shareholders, money 
is invested in order to allow the company to grow and prosper. In the case of stakeholders 
(Freeman, 1984) effort is invested in order to align the company with the expectations of 
society hence to safeguard its social legitimacy (sustainability). Today making an 
investment into tangible resources is not enough. Increasingly there is a need to equally 
invest and protect the intangible resources. This creates new expectations from investors 
as they require the development of new skills. 
 
Hand and Lev (2003:2) suggest that:  
 
“Wealth and growth in modern economies are driven primarily by 
intangible assets, defined as claims to future benefits that do not have a 
physical or financial form. Patents, bioengineered drugs, brands, strategic 
alliances, customer lists, a proprietary cost-reducing internet-based supply 
chain-these are all examples of intangible assets. The more traditional 
physical and financial assets are rapidly becoming commodities, since they 
are equally accessible to competitors, and consequently yield at least a 
competitive return on investment. … As a result intangibles are 
increasingly taking center stage in firm’s business strategies and the 
valuation calculus performed by investors”. 
 
In order for investors to be considered as ethical they need to prioritise the intangible 
(positive social and environmental outcomes) rather than financial outcomes. They could 
further leverage their investment by closely monitoring the processes that affect the 
intangible resources as a matter of priority and by seeking relevant expertise. Nonprofit 
organisations can be a source of in-depth technical knowledge and valuable information 
that will allow ethical investors to assess their portfolio investments.  
 
The relationships between financial investors and corporations are in close proximity 
with each other constrained by financial dependency similarly with NPO-BUS 
partnerships. In order for continuous and substantial change to take place there is a need 
to address systematically the failure to deliver change due the relationship proximity, i.e. 
to externalise the conflict of interest that exists between the aims of an SRI fund and the 
corporation by entering into strategic partnerships with more experienced social actors on 
relevant issues (such as environmental NPOs). Through a/ active engagement between 
stakeholders that hold knowledge and expertise and b/ within the public arena, i.e. 
fostering an overt conversation would entail a strategy for not only protecting but also 
leveraging intangible assets. For example, an investment made by a corporation to a NPO 
within a partnership relationship is equally reciprocated by the NPO towards the 
corporation and constitutes a reciprocal intangible investment. Similarly the relationship 
between an SRI and a corporation can entail an intangible asset if it does not serve as a 
priority the maximisation of profit. Such relationships are intangible assets as the 
reputation of SRIs (an intangible asset) is at stake due to their responsibilities towards 
their clients.  
 
The role of investors is crucial in facilitating the shift from the tangible to the intangible 
economy, by co-determining the responsibilities of corporations together with other 
stakeholders. The investment and protection of intangibles requires the development of 
new skills such as knowledge based confidence, confrontational writing and speaking, 
argumentation based on in depth specialist information, developing creative discourse 
around a technical issue, imagining alternatives; skills that traditionally have been 
developed by stakeholders (such as environmental NPOs). 
 
Drucker in 1989 suggested that an important and unexpected positive outcome for BUS is 
the new management practices BUS can learn and adapt from NPOs which have 
experience with multiple bottom lines, similar to the recent triple bottom line perspective 
that BUS need to attend to. Moon (2004:1) suggested that in the UK “CSR was part of a 
wider re-orientation of governance roles”. It seems that CSR implementation needs to 
progress to a higher level of sophistication in order to incorporate mechanisms that will 
prioritise intangibles assets. Hence more research is required into intangibles within the 
context of Corporate Social Responsibility. 
 
Based on the above there is a difference between espousing a change discourse and 
claiming that SRIs, shareholder activism or NPO-BUS partnerships have influenced 
corporations in order to deliver organisational change. Organisations that work in high 
proximity over time is difficult to challenge and confront their ‘partners’ in order to 
deliver change. Delivering positive societal outcomes would need the development of 
new skills. Similarly with the collaborative NPOs, SRI funds and shareholder activism 
need to assume a more critical role towards BUSs and increase their collaboration within 
their own sector and across different sectors in order to contribute and strengthen the 
societal dimension of their role. 
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Endnotes: 
                                                                                                                                                 
i
 In the London Stock Exchange FTSE4GOOD is a special index that includes companies that meet the 
inclusion criteria that offer testimony of responsible practices. For more information: 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/Criteria_Documents/index.jsp 
Also in the US the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), launched in 1999, a global index that aims to 
track the financial performance of sustainability-driven companies worldwide and currently manages over 4 
billion EUR. For more information:  http://www.sustainability-indexes.com/htmle/other/faq.html 
 
ii
 In 2005 the GRI reported 750 companies that used the Sustainability Reporting guidelines (GRI, 2006). 
The Global compact reported that world wide (last update of information on line 29th March 2006) 2,500 
businesses are included in its network (Global Compact, 2006). 
 
iii
 According to Friends of the Earth: “Major categories of environmental resolutions include: global 
warming, energy, genetically engineered food, environmentally sensitive areas, toxics, and sustainability 
reporting” (FoE, 2007). 
